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Abstract
This paper addresses the question of the optimal debt level of a state (canton) that issues new bonds and
subsequently invests the borrowed capital. For that purpose, we first estimate the effect of the debt level on the
interest rate and then we contrast the predicted interest rate with potential revenue from the capital markets. The
estimation is based on panel data from the 26 Swiss cantons between 1980 and 2015. The median performance of
Swiss pension funds serves as a reference value for the revenue achieved in the capital market. The results show an
exponential relationship between the debt and its interest rate; raising indebtedness by 1000 Swiss francs per
capita makes the spread between the risk-free rate and the interest rate on the debt increase by 5%. Given this
small effect, the inherent optimal debt level equals more than twice the initial levels and the reinvested
uncommitted funds provide a return potential of nearly 5% of the total cantonal receipts, on average.
Keywords: Public debt management, Government bonds, Sustainability, Credit market, Regional government,
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1 Background
This paper argues that governments can benefit from
higher indebtedness. When the price of the borrowed
capital falls below the return rate in the capital markets,
the government can issue bonds and invest the raised
capital on the capital market. These leveraged invest-
ments yield a net profit to the government, which is
reinforced when taking the equity premium puzzle into
account. The equity premium is the discount on the inter-
est rates of public bonds in comparison to other asset
classes that remain after deducting the risk premium.
Nevertheless, such a practice has its limits, because an
ascending debt level amplifies the default risk, leading
lenders to ask for higher yields. If the government
stretches it out, the costs of borrowing exceed the return
rate and the leveraged investments become unprofitable.
The combination of a fixed return rate and a dynamic
interest rate motivates the main research question treated
here. What is the optimal debt level of a government that
utilizes available but uncommitted financial assets for
leveraged investments in the capital markets? To establish
this, one needs to first identify what determines the
interest rate of the public debt. The debt level itself is the
most salient of these determinants, and taken together,
they make it possible to trace an interest rate curve along
the debt axis. The interest rate curve then allows one to
estimate an interest rate for each debt level (ceteris pari-
bus) and also suffices for estimating the optimal debt level.
In the last step, we report profit estimates a government
can expect if it follows such a debt optimization strategy.
In our model, when the government increases its debt,
the interest rate on the debt grows exponentially. Based
on our estimates, raising indebtedness by 1000 Swiss
francs (CHF) per capita makes the spread between the
risk-free rate and the interest rate on the debt (the
interest spread henceforth) increase by 5%.1 Since the
model is non-linear, the absolute values of the interest rate
depend on all the other determinants of the debt’s interest
rate. On average from 1997 to 2015, the optimal debt level
of the Swiss cantons amounted to 17,736 Swiss francs per
capita, more than double the mean actual debt of 7027
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Swiss francs per capita. If one always set the debt at its
optimal level, this would add 4.78% to total cantonal
receipts. With more conservative strategies, this would,
on average, drop to below 1 %.
It is striking that the optimal debt level exceeds the
actual debt level by this much, but it results from the
temporary high return rates in the capital markets, the
relatively inelastic interest rate with respect to debt, and
from our assumption of a risk-indifferent government.
Yet, doubling the current debt does not yield aberrant
values since cantons are in general moderately indebted.
Accounting for profitable assets on state balance sheets
adds to the existing literature on the sustainability of
public debt. The classic public finance literature considers
high indebtedness problematic because it carries a risk of
falling into the debt trap. Blanchard et al. (1991) consider
a fiscal policy to be sustainable over the long run if the
debt-to-GDP ratio remained stable. Their model included
only gross debt, GDP growth, the interest rate, receipts,
and expenditures, and was based on holding the tax rate
constant and using an intertemporal budget constraint.
In its simplicity, this model neglected two important
aspects that affect debt sustainability. First, focusing on
gross debt disregards assets. Referring to the same
model, Blankart (2017) justifies the preference for the
gross over of the net debt by arguing that a government’s
assets are usually assumed to be inalienable: subtracting
them would present the fiscal situation as better than it
actually is. Moreover, asset valuation can vary signi-
ficantly, which makes it hard to compare. However, both
arguments are untenable for assets composed of liquid
financial investments (Giammarioli, Nickel, Rother,
and Vidal, 2006). Second, excluding assets ignores the
revenue they can potentially generate.
The literature which focuses specifically on the manage-
ment of government assets and liabilities does acknowledge
the contribution to revenue which spare (uncommitted)
funds make. However, these articles tend to treat the
returns from uncommitted funds as a welcome byproduct
rather than as main objective of asset management.
Instead, the asset and liability management literature
subordinates the debt level in favor of guaranteeing con-
stant solvency (Das, Lu, Papaioannou, and Petrova, 2013).
Bohn (2002) goes one step further in his consideration of
strategies a government that holds uncommitted funds
could take. One of his proposals argues that “a positive
[equity] premium provides an arbitrage opportunity for the
government [ …] to earn seigniorage-like profits by issuing
debt and investing the proceeds.”While this strategy implies
the existence of an optimal debt level, Bohn leaves the ques-
tion unanswered of how to determine this optimum.
To our knowledge, there is no other literature which
discusses such asset and liability practices. As a result,
our paper links two strands of argument together. The
first strand relies on earlier studies estimating the in-
fluence of debt on the borrowing cost of a state. The
second draws on the literature about the equity pre-
mium, meaning the spread between the interest rate on
public debt and the return rate from other assets on the
capital market (the return spread henceforth).
The list of publications estimating the interest rate curve
in relation to the debt is long and covers not only different
layers of government but also several geographic regions.
The first studies dealing with the dependence of public
debt on the interest rate focused on the USA. Barth, Iden,
and Russek (1984) reviewed some of the early studies
that examined this effect at the federal level and repli-
cated them successfully. Later, researchers improved on
the models and analyzed other levels of government
(Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom, 1995; Capeci, 1994;
Poterba and Rueben, 1997). Later on, the geographical
scope widened not just to Canada (Booth, Georgopoulos,
and Hejazi, 2007; Schuknecht, von Hagen, and Wolswijk,
2009) but have included comparisons of 20 industrialized
and developing countries (De Mello, 2001), and emerging
market countries (Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008). Later,
the work of Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Attinasi,
Checherita, and Nickel (2011) offered an overview of the
European area. Küttel and Kugler (2002) and Feld, Kalb,
Moessinger, and Osterloh (2017) focused on Swiss can-
tons. In the many national and international studies
addressing this question, the debt level has always served
as an explanatory variable and, if it is significant, it usually
affects the interest rate positively.
Most studies have analyzed panel data and began with
simple fixed effects estimators. Because of endogeneity
and autocorrelation, more sophisticated methods in-
tegrating instrumental variables often followed, not least
because endogeneity creates a major problem in the
econometric estimations. More precisely, whereas Capeci
(1994) assumed a reverse causality between the debt level
and the interest rate, Bayoumi et al. (1995) looked at fac-
tors that simultaneously influence both. The functional
form of the interest rate curve has also been intensively
discussed, with Baldacci and Kumar (2010) finding some
evidence for non-linearities in the relationship. Our
research incorporates both concerns. The endogeneity
problem is tackled using the system general methods of
moments (GMM) estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
As regards the functional form of the interest rate curve,
we follow Akitoby and Stratmann (2008), who theore-
tically deduced an exponential link between the interest
spread and its determinants.
The second strand of literature related to leveraged in-
vestment investigates the return spread, whereas the
risk-free rate is usually put on a level with long-term
government bond yields. The classic financial market
theory that accounts for the risk premium and the
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default premium does not entirely explain the return
spread. Apparently, the solution hides within the sur-
prisingly cheap borrowing costs of the government. Put
differently, “[t] he equity premium puzzle may not be
why was the average equity return so high but rather
why was the average risk-free rate so low” (Mehra and
Prescott, 1985, p. 158). So either investors are parti-
cularly risk-averse and therefore accept a special discount
for risk-free bonds, or transaction costs, in the form of
credit ratings, disappear in the case of government bonds,
as they are considered risk-free anyway. Based on these
two explanations, Bohn (1999) examined the conditions
under which exploiting the equity premium puzzle is
beneficial from a taxpayers’ point of view. However, his
understanding of exploiting low-interest rates confined
itself to the analysis of generational risk distribution. He
did not consider profitable investments. In a later empi-
rical investigation, he found that the equity premium dis-
appears at a certain level of debt. The government should
therefore keep its debt level below a certain threshold in
order to benefit from generous interest rates (Bohn, 2011).
For our purposes, this literature strand justifies the focus
on the interest rates of government bonds, as they consti-
tute the origin of the inexplicably large return spread.
When it comes to testing the theory, the Swiss can-
tonal setting, a second layer of government comparable
to USA states, is valuable because it enables an empirical
test of the theory. In terms of fiscal, economic, demo-
graphic, and institutional factors to investigate, the
cantons vary considerably. Yet, the cantons are uniform in
terms of the definition and measurement of fiscal indica-
tors (Krishnakumar, Martin, and Soguel, 2010). Based on
panel data from all 26 cantons over the period from 1980
to 2015, we estimate the interest rate as a function of the
debt level. After that, we relate the estimated interest rate
with the median performance of the Swiss pension funds
which serves as a reference value for the revenue achieved
in the capital market (see below).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
2 highlights the methods. More precisely, it takes up the
theory of the classic debt trap and adds assets together
with their revenues to it. The following two subsections
are dedicated to the identification strategy and to the
declaration of the empirical field; it also contains the
data. The subsequent section three presents our estima-
tions of the interest rate curve and the attainable profits.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Methods
2.1 Considering assets to overcome the classic debt trap
Blanchard et al. (1991) formalized the sustainability of
public debt relatively simply. They defined the current
debt as the sum of the previous gross public debt B, of the
debt service iB, where i denotes the interest rate, and of
the government expenditures before interest payments
G minus total receipts R; subscripts indicate the year:
Bt ¼ Gt−Rt þ Bt−1 þ iBt−1 ð1Þ
As long as the primary balance G − R finances the debt
service, the debt is considered sustainable; otherwise, the
government falls into the debt trap. In other words, sus-
tainability is defined as Bt − Bt − 1 ≤ 0. Using this defin-
ition and dividing (1) by the gross domestic product
(GDP) Y, the sustainability condition becomes less re-
strictive, as economic growth can compensate for an in-
crease of the absolute debt:
Bt
Y t
≤
Gt
Y t
−
Rt
Y t
þ 1þ ið ÞBt−1
1þ gð ÞY t−1 where gt ≡
Y t
Y t−1
−1 ð2Þ
where g represents the economic growth. Approximat-
ing ð1þiÞð1þgÞ ≈ 1þ i−g if g and i are close to zero and re-
arranging (2) yields:
Rt
Y t
−
Gt
Y t
≥ it−gt
  Bt−1
Y t−1
ð3Þ
Inequation (3) shows that the primary surplus must be
at least as high as the weighted difference between the
interest rate and economic growth. Furthermore, if the
economy grows strongly enough compared to the inter-
est rate, a primary deficit does not necessarily lead to an
increased debt rate.
In line with the classic model, debt has thus far impli-
citly been considered in gross terms. For the sake of sim-
plicity, set the equity equal to zero such that the liability
side only consists of gross debt. Taking now the asset
side of the balance sheet into account, denote K as the
productive capital, meaning the amount of public assets
bound to functions of the government such as infra-
structure, schools, or hospitals. This is the inalienable
part mentioned above and, by assumption, it does not
generate any financial return for the government.
Denote I as the amount of public assets that is unbound
(i.e., uncommitted).2 Assume that I generates revenue
with a return rate r. Accordingly, the total receipts (R)
now consist of taxes, transfers, and other receipts, char-
acterized by T on the one hand. On the other hand, the
return on the unbound assets I (i.e., B − K) also contri-
butes to total receipts, such that Rt = Tt + rt(Bt − 1 −Kt − 1).
Substituting R in (3) and rearranging yields:
Gt
Y t
−
Tt
Y t
≤ rt−it−gt rt−1ð Þ
  Bt−1
Y t−1
−rt 1−gt
  Kt−1
Y t−1
ð4Þ
If the inequality holds, the debt is sustainable, and the
smaller (larger) the left side (right side) of the inequality,
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the lower is the risk of falling into the debt trap. Accordingly,
under the condition that g(r − 1) < r − i holds, it is bene-
ficial to raise the debt (B). As regards the interpretation
of this condition, first note that in a growing economy
(g > 0) with a return rate which equals or exceeds the
interest rate (r ≥ i), the condition is met and the govern-
ment benefits from raising the debt. Second, in a
shrinking economy (g < 0), the interest rate needs to be
negative (i < 0) as soon as economic growth drops
below the level of the return rate (g < r). Third, part of
the difference between the interest rate and the return
rate accrues from the equity premium puzzle. Note that
raising the debt can already be beneficial in inequation
(3) if the economic growth exceeds the interest rate
(Blankart, 2017). However, with the division of the debt,
obtaining receipts by raising the debt is also possible if
the interest rate exceeds economic growth.
This advanced debt trap indicates that a government
can use the equity premium puzzle without risking an un-
sustainable debt under the assumption that the interest
rate is independent of the debt level. In the following, we
examine a government’s profit potential from raising the
debt in a single year when the interest rate increases with
the debt level, but without considering the relative terms.
Assume that at stage 0, the government has outstanding
debt of B0, which is entirely bound up in productive ca-
pital K and does not yield any revenue. The government
pays interest in the amount of B0i0. Then, at stage 1, the
government decides to benefit from the equity premium
puzzle and issues a new bond. The total outstanding debt
is now B1 (K + I above). Due to the increase in the debt,
the capital market charges a higher interest rate i1, such
that the total interest paid is B1i1.
3 At the same time, the
government invests the unbound assets I = B1 − B0 with a
return rate r, obtaining a return of (B1 − B0)r. The profit
(Π) results from the difference between the additional
receipts and the additional expenditures:
Π ¼ B1−B0ð Þr− B1i1−B0i0ð Þ
¼ B1 r−i1ð Þ−B0 r−i0ð Þ ð5Þ
Above, we already imposed the assumption that the inter-
est rate on the debt is endogenous, or more precisely, that
the interest rate curve as a function of the debt is increasing
and convex (Kumar and Baldacci, 2010).4 To approximate
the adjustment of the interest rate due to higher debt, we
follow Akitoby and Stratmann (2008). They split the inter-
est rate into a risk-free rate f and a risk premium. We define
the latter as interest spread s ≡ i1 − f. A risk-indifferent
lender demands an interest spread such that it compensates
for a potential default that is defined as occurring with
probability p, formally: (1 + f ) = (1 − p)(1 + s + f ). Re-
arranging yields s ¼ p1−p ð1þ f Þ and we parametrize the
default probability as p ≡ expðγB1þβ
0xÞ
1þ expðγB1þβ0xÞ. Together with the
debt level B1, the parameter vector x determines the default
probability weighted by the coefficients γ and β. Substi-
tuting p and rearranging results in s = exp(γB1 + β
′x)(1 + f)
or in logarithmic terms ln(s) = γB1 + β
′x + ln(1 + f). The last
summand is constant and affiliates to the constant in x.
Hence, the interest spread is determined by the following
exponential function:
ln sð Þ ¼ ln i1− fð Þ ¼ γB1 þ β0x ð6Þ
The coefficients of (6) are estimated in the empirical
part. Note that the convexity assumption above requires
γ to be positive. Having defined the functional form of
the interest rate, this allows us to derive an optimal debt
level B1 which maximizes profit. The optimal debt level
B1 satisfies the following condition:
∂Π
∂B1
¼ r−i1−B1
∂i1
∂B1
¼ r− exp γB1 þ β0x
 þ f −B1γ exp γB1 þ β0x
 
¼ 0
ð7Þ
Solving (7) with respect to B1 is impossible because of
the exponential specification of the interest spread (6).
Yet, even if no exact analytical solution for B1 in condi-
tion (7) is feasible, there is nonetheless a numerical one.
The function to solve for B1 is
γB1þβ0xþ ln 1þ γB1
  ¼ ln r− fð Þ ð8Þ
The following subsection proposes an estimation strat-
egy to evaluate the parameters, which enables one to de-
termine B1 . Note that in reality, the government would
probably also consider the risk of a loss; this is not con-
sidered here. The government, just as the lender, is as-
sumed to be risk-indifferent.
2.2 Identification strategy
In order to identify the coefficient of debt, i.e., γ, we
need to eliminate all confounding variation in the
dependent variable. In a first step, this means addres-
sing the endogeneity issues. The second step follows in
the subsequent section and identifies the covariates
necessary for identification.
As already stressed in the literature review, the deci-
sion to invest and to issue new debt depends on the
cost involved, which induces an endogeneity problem
when estimating the effect of the debt level on the
interest rate. Another endogeneity problem emerges with
the model specification. Due to the high persistence of
interest rates,5 several authors recommend a dynamic
panel data model, where the lagged dependent variable
enters as an additional regressor (Attinasi et al. 2011).
Based on (6), the estimation equation then becomes:
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ln sc;tþ1
  ¼ β0þδ ln sc;t
 þ γBc;t þ β0xc;t þ αc
þ ϵc;t ð9Þ
where the subscripts c and t denote the canton and the
time, respectively. Besides the error term ϵc, t, the
estimation Eq. (9) expands the primal function of the
interest spread curve (6) by a cantonal fixed effect αc. In
addition, the interest spread is delayed by one time
period because lenders cannot respond to the infor-
mation in the same year they receive it (Engen and
Hubbard, 2004). Accordingly, the lagged dependent
variable corresponds to the same year as the covariates.
The standard approach to eliminate the individual fixed
effect transforms the data into first differences, whereby
the equation becomes
Δln sc;tþ1
  ¼ Δln sc;t
 
δþ ΔBc;tγ þ
X
l
Δ xc;t;lβl þ Δϵc;t ð10Þ
At this point, the endogeneity issue occurs again, since
the differenced lagged dependent variable depends on
the differenced error term.6 Pleasantly, Arellano and
Bond (1991) propose a set of internal instruments that
obviate the search for additional variables. They find that
the second lag of the dependent variable (i.e., ln(sc, t − 1))
satisfies the requirements of an instrument.7 In fact, dee-
per lags (i.e., ln(sc, t − 2)) are suitable too, and they poten-
tially increase the efficiency. The missing values of
earlier observations which thereby automatically result
can be replaced by zeros in the instrument matrix, which
prevents losing observations. Under the assumption that
the differenced lagged dependent variable (Δln(sc, t), i.e.,
changes in the interest spread) are independent of the
cantonal fixed effects (αc, e.g., a systematic discri-
mination of a canton due to an unobservable factor),
additional instruments can increase the efficiency even
further. Exploiting this assumption, Blundell and Bond
(1998) suggests adding level equations, where the differ-
enced endogenous variables are suitable as instruments
for their respective levels. This estimator came to be
known as system GMM. For the reasons outlined above,
the system GMM seems to be the most appropriate
estimator for our purpose.8
2.3 Empirical field and variables
The 26 Swiss cantons offer considerable longitudinal
data going back to 1980. To identify and categorize the
determinants of a cantonal default, Daldoss and Foraita
(2003) developed a framework to rate Swiss polities
which included institutional conditions, budget stability,
and financial capacity. Further literature has provided
specific measurable variables to fill in these categories.
The first category, the institutional conditions, gives
an indication of a canton’s future debt potential. This
can be derived from the underlying rules that are often
legally or constitutionally enshrined. These may include
debt limitations based on balance sheets, funds, or spe-
cial financing not on balance sheets, or current accounts.
Regulations mandating disclosures are also part of the
institutional conditions (Daldoss and Foraita, 2003).
Previous studies have found significant negative effects
debt brakes exercise on interest rates (Feld et al. 2017).
The debt brake index takes on higher values the more
comprehensive the fiscal rule is, that is, when the follo-
wing elements are considered: the connection between
budget planning and execution, numerical constraints,
and effective sanctions in the form of tax increases. Simi-
larly, more stringent fiscal referenda lead to lower interest
rates (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2008; Luechinger and
Schaltegger, 2013). The index which approximates the
stringency of referenda is based on the number of sig-
natures necessary to launch the referendum relative to the
total population (Frey and Stutzer, 2000). Finally, lenders
may penalize arbitrary financial information and therefore
demand higher risk premiums from cantons operating
under older or less-known accounting standards.
The second category, budget stability, is informational
and deals with current data (Daldoss and Foraita, 2003).
Gross debt is the most pertinent variable here and consists
of current, short-term, and long-term liabilities. Interest
receivable serves not only a proxy for government
solvency, but it also approximates existing unbound
assets (denoted I above) that already generate revenues.
Likewise, lenders might reduce the interest spread when a
canton has more direct control over their revenue sources.
We therefore include tax revenue as an additional control
variable. Further, overall fiscal balance gives the lenders a
clue as to whether the borrower will be able to repay
his debt. Repeated deficits suggest problems with debt
reimbursement (Booth et al. 2007; Küttel and Kugler,
2002).9 Before 2003, lenders also had to keep an eye
on the fiscal balance of municipalities, as it was un-
clear whether cantons were obliged to bail them out in
case of insolvency. In 2003, the Swiss Supreme Court
denied this obligation. To test the respective effects on
the interest rate of the cantons, one variable capturing
the municipalities’ overall fiscal balance, a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 after 2003, and the
interaction of these two variables are included in the
model (Feld et al. 2017).
Capacity is the operative word of the third category,
financial capacity, which connects the two other catego-
ries as it provides information about the present and the
future. A strong economy indicates a potential for higher
tax revenue. Higher tax revenues enlarge the scope for
paying back outstanding debt, which pushes down
interest rates (De Mello, 2001; Engen and Hubbard, 2004).
By contrast, the more the unemployment rate rises, the
lower the tax revenue is expected to be.10 Hence, the
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latitude for debt servicing is lower. Controlling ad-
ditionally for, and thus holding constant, the population
and its growth, makes it possible to more precisely
identify through which channel GDP influences interest
rates. Furthermore, a higher proportion of elderly and
younger citizens exert upward pressure on expenditures
while they contribute relatively weakly to the tax base
(Krishnakumar et al. 2010). Lenders might use the popula-
tion share above 65 and below 18 years as a predictor of
increased fiscal stress. The amount of money that a gov-
ernment spends on public services also depends in part
on its ideological background. Right-wing and conserva-
tive parties tend to be associated with a more restrictive
fiscal policy. Lenders can expect a lower probability of de-
fault if these parties are in power (Akitoby and Stratmann,
2008). The variable “bourgeois parties in executive”
expresses the fraction of right-wing and conservative par-
ties in the cantonal executive council. Finally, politicians
might also have an incentive to manipulate fiscal variables
at the end of their term. We therefore include a dummy
indicating the year before an election.
As concerns the dependent variable “interest spread”,
we base our arguments on De Mello (2001), who calcu-
lates the interest rate on public debt by dividing the debt
service by the gross debt. This is an appealing measure
for Switzerland because the Federal Finance Administra-
tion provides the respective values for all Swiss cantons
for all the years examined. To account for the problem
that gross debt varies throughout the year but debt
servicing only provides a snapshot at the end of the
accounting period, we use the mean of the debt level at
the beginning and the end of the year.
Operationalizing the interest rate is only half of the
measure of the interest spread. The risk-free rate still
needs to be determined, and its typical proxy is the yield
of a 10-year national government bond. However, pro-
ceeding this way leads, in the Swiss case, to the problem
that almost half of the cantons repeatedly exhibit nega-
tive values in their interest spread, and using logarithms
results in all of these observations dropping out of the
analysis. As an alternative, we define the smallest annual
cantonal interest rate as the risk-free rate. While this
approach confines the loss of data to one observation per
year,11 it also systematically excludes the cantons with the
lowest interest rates from the sample (i.e., it truncates the
data). Consequently, the resulting coefficients provide an
overly conservative picture, as they are likely to be biased
towards zero (Greene, 2003). Although a robustness check
relativizes the truncation issue, it needs to be kept in mind
when interpreting the results.
Using these variables allows us to estimate the coeffi-
cients of the interest spread curve (9). However, to
calculate the optimal debt level using Eq. (8), the possible
return from the capital market is missing. The possible
return depends on the risk a canton is allowed or willing
to take. On the one hand, cantonal asset and liability
rules usually prohibit the cantons from leveraged ven-
turing in the capital markets. On the other hand, they
specify which categories to invest liquid assets, and they
are comparable to those mentioned in the Swiss Federal
Law on Occupational Retirement and its subsidiary
ordinance. The two decrees dictate where the Swiss
pension funds may invest. If a certain risk corresponds
to each investment category and the cantons are
allowed to invest in the same categories as the Swiss
pension funds, then the actual return of the pension
funds and the possible return of the cantons are equal.
Thus, the return of the Swiss pension funds is an
adequate reference value for the possible return of the
cantons.12 A yearly survey among the Swiss pension
funds reports the median values of their performance
since 1997 (see Swisscanto Vorsorge AG, 2017 for the
most recent study). Figure 3 in the Appendix illustrates
the respective data.
Table 3 gives an overview of the variables and yields
some preliminary empirical insights. While the cantonal
interest rate averages 3.36%, the mean risk-free rate
comes to 1.49%, leading to an interest spread of 1.87%
on average. Taking the debt as the main regressor, its
variation is conspicuous. The average gross debt is
moderate, at a level of 6000 Swiss francs per capita.
Breaking ranks, the two cantons of Basel City and
Geneva had an average debt per capita of over 20,000
Swiss francs between 1980 and 2015. Yet, the interest
rates of these two cantons do not substantially exceed
those of the others.
To show the time-related development of the observed
values, Fig. 1 plots the interest spread and the debt per
capita of the Swiss cantons in 1980 and 2015. The theory
would predict a convex point cloud from the lower left to
the upper right corner. Considering the black dots only
(i.e., observations from 2015), one can actually observe a
tendency, though one cannot discern a trend in the white
dots (i.e., 1980). Likewise, the temporal dynamics are
equally unclear. Most cantons benefited from a lower
interest rate in 2015 compared to 1980; worldwide sagging
interest rates may have contributed to this. At the same
time, few cantons were able to reduce their debt.
3 Results and discussion
3.1 Estimated interest rate curves
In order to contrast the more sophisticated System
GMM estimator, we first present the results of an OLS
regression with cantonal fixed effects, as reported in
model 1 in the first column of Table 1. As Nickell (1981)
demonstrates, the estimated coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable (here amounting to 0.761) is down-
ward biased because of the inherent endogeneity; the
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other regressors are inconsistent too. The debt coeffi-
cient is very small and not significant, just as are most of
the other covariates. The remaining models therefore all
make use of the System GMM estimator.
The baseline model 2 accounts for the endogeneity of
the lagged dependent variable and the debt through the
GMM-style instruments. The estimates thus obtained
are consistent if the underlying assumptions hold. The
pertinent test statistics are reported at the bottom of
Table 1. While we expect first-order autocorrelation (AR
(1), by construction), second-order autocorrelation AR
(2) would question the validity of the GMM-style instru-
ments. None of the models violates the requirements.
Also, to successfully eliminate endogeneity, the instru-
ments must be exogenous. The exogeneity of instruments
is the null-hypothesis of the Hansen test, which accord-
ingly should never be rejected. All our estimates satisfy
this criterion too. Admittedly, the Hansen test weakens
with a higher instrument count, which is why we strongly
restrict the creation of internal instruments. Specifically,
the depth of the GMM-instruments only ranges from the
second to the third lag, resulting in a total of 41 instru-
ments in the baseline regression; the sheer number of
regressors is the main driver of the instrument count.
Focusing on the coefficients of the baseline model 2,
the lagged dependent variable shows a highly significant
value of 0.877, which exceeds the downward biased OLS
estimate of the model (1). The positive significant effect
reflects the persistence of cantonal interest spreads that
come about due to having long-term bonds with fixed
yields in the cantonal portfolio. At the same time, the
debt significantly determines the interest spread, with an
expected positive sign. As concerns the control variables,
two variables in the category budget stability provide
some evidence for their significant effect on the interest
spread. Both the interest receivable and the tax revenue
affect the interest spread negatively, as expected. Apart
from that, only nominal GDP, unemployment, and the
accounting standard show a coefficient different from
zero at the 10 % significance level.13
In this, counter to expectations, we were surprised to
find a negative GDP coefficient and positive unemploy-
ment coefficient. To explain this, we would like to stress
the meager impact the economic situation has. Increasing
the GDP by one standard deviation widens the interest
spread by 8% (= 0.004 × 19.903) as compared to a 27%
(= 0.048 × 5.621) augmentation when increasing the debt
by one standard deviation.14 Given that small amplitude
investors seem rather focus on direct effects of an eco-
nomic boom, such as rising tax revenues.
To check the robustness of our main result, we altered
several specifications. Model 3 accounts for potential iden-
tification problems when disregarding non-administrative
assets and equity. As these two variables are only avail-
able starting in 1990, the number of observations
drops considerably. The resulting debt coefficient rises
marginally to 0.055 and remains significant. Model 4
assesses the coefficients’ sensitivity to time-fixed
effects and includes them, which drastically increases
the instrument count to 105. In reaction to that, the
Fig. 1 Interest spread and debt per capita of Swiss cantons 1980 ad 2015
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Table 1 Regression results
(1)
Fixed
effects
(2)
Baseline
(3) Assets
and equity
(4) Year
dummies
(5) Two
step
(6)
Endogenous
(7) Lags (8) No GE
and BS
(9) Interest
rate
(10) No
conditions
(11) No
capacity
(12) No
stability
Lagged dependent
variable
0.761*** 0.877*** 0.769*** 0.592*** 0.791*** 0.646*** 0.826*** 0.854*** 0.750*** 0.894*** 0.816*** 0.828***
(0.057) (0.119) (0.128) (0.093) (0.179) (0.116) (0.107) (0.129) (0.074) (0.125) (0.130) (0.132)
Debt (1000 CHF
per capita)
0.004 0.048** 0.055** 0.039** 0.126** 0.034* 0.037** 0.087** 6.867** 0.051** 0.033* 0.030*
(0.007) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.053) (0.020) (0.017) (0.039) (2.992) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015)
Cantonal overall
fiscal balance
(1000 CHF per
capita)
0.043 0.060 0.021 0.031 0.158 0.093 0.058 0.087** − 0.775 0.066 0.059
(0.035) (0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.101) (0.057) (0.038) (0.036) (3.499) (0.039) (0.038)
Equity (in 1000
CHF per capita)
0.036**
(0.014)
Cantonal non-
administrative
assets (in 1000
CHF per capita)
− 0.027
(0.018)
Interest receivable
(1000 CHF per
capita)
− 0.110 − 0.187** − 0.190** − 0.123* − 0.462 − 0.211 −
0.179**
− 0.214** − 20.094 − 0.193** −
0.150**
(0.089) (0.077) (0.071) (0.066) (0.624) (0.132) (0.071) (0.079) (13.034) (0.078) (0.066)
Tax revenue (1000
CHF per capita)
− 0.025 − 0.112** − 0.068 − 0.091* − 0.264** − 0.095* − 0.083* − 0.118** − 15.553** − 0.120** − 0.060*
(0.037) (0.045) (0.040) (0.047) (0.125) (0.052) (0.042) (0.043) (7.527) (0.046) (0.035)
Municipal fiscal
balance (1000
CHF per capita)
− 0.040 0.002 0.024 0.301** − 0.645 0.052 0.000 − 0.013 21.012 − 0.012 − 0.008
(0.075) (0.083) (0.083) (0.109) (0.729) (0.103) (0.081) (0.081) (12.352) (0.079) (0.070)
No bailout
(dummy = 1
after 2003)
−
0.105**
0.041 0.014 0.848 0.976* − 0.073 − 0.005 0.040 9.018 0.044 0.007
(0.041) (0.071) (0.067) (0.763) (0.560) (0.104) (0.063) (0.074) (10.832) (0.083) (0.070)
Municipal fiscal
balance X no
bailout
0.169 0.048 − 0.012 −0.197 0.399 − 0.043 0.061 0.012 − 24.251 0.097 0.036
(0.147) (0.123) (0.126) (0.146) (0.628) (0.154) (0.125) (0.114) (19.478) (0.124) (0.123)
Cantonal nominal
GDP (1000 CHF
per capita)
0.004 0.004* 0.002 0.001 0.004* 0.004 0.003 0.004 − 0.003 0.003 − 0.005*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.289) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (population) − 0.335 − 0.006 0.039* 0.046* 0.151* 0.026 0.003 −0.017 1.740 0.001 0.006
(0.412) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.088) (0.035) (0.016) (0.023) (3.449) (0.018) (0.028)
Population growth
(in %)
0.008 − 0.011 − 0.005 0.019 − 0.005 0.012 − 0.010 − 0.004 2.000 − 0.014 − 0.004
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.039) (0.034) (0.021) (0.026) (4.701) (0.020) (0.020)
Elderly (as % of
total population)
− 0.007 − 0.003 0.009 0.022* 0.030 0.005 −0.002 −0.009 1.270 −0.002 −0.014
(0.015) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.036) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.854) (0.006) (0.014)
Young (as % of
total population)
− 0.001 − 0.005 0.025 0.003 0.061 − 0.005 − 0.003 − 0.006 − 2.239 − 0.005 − 0.003
(0.017) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.040) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (1.402) (0.008) (0.008)
Unemployment
(in %)
0.001 − 0.026* − 0.029** − 0.006 − 0.061* − 0.018 − 0.019 − 0.033* − 3.419 − 0.023* −
0.025**
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.027) (0.030) (0.021) (0.012) (0.017) (2.740) (0.012) (0.012)
Bourgeois parties
in executive (as %
of all members)
0.001 0.001 0.001 − 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 − 0.158 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.168) (0.001) (0.001)
Referendum
stringency (index)
− 0.010 − 0.015 0.006 0.002 0.019 − 0.062 − 0.009 − 0.004 − 0.991 0.003 0.004
(0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.039) (0.069) (0.012) (0.015) (2.124) (0.008) (0.011)
Accounting
standard (index)
− 0.081 − 0.101* − 0.256*** 0.007 − 0.347** − 0.076 − 0.099* − 0.117* 2.263 − 0.085* − 0.100*
(0.054) (0.050) (0.091) (0.043) (0.164) (0.075) (0.051) (0.068) (3.600) (0.047) (0.055)
Debt brake
(index)
0.019 0.014 0.000 − 0.003 − 0.086 − 0.064 0.004 0.025 2.700 0.002 0.021
(0.036) (0.015) (0.023) (0.024) (0.055) (0.072) (0.015) (0.021) (2.863) (0.011) (0.026)
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coefficient of the debt drops to 0.039, but it is still sta-
tistically significant. The lower coefficient results from
overall positive time-fixed effects (not reported) that
absorb symmetric cantonal changes of the debt and the
interest spread. In contrast to the one-step estimation as it
is applied in the baseline model, the two-step estimation
holds the promise of yielding more efficient coefficient
estimates while providing over-optimistic standard errors
for finite samples. In response, Windmeijer (2005) de-
veloped a correction for small samples. However, the
re-estimation of the baseline model using the two-step
procedure (model 5) and the Windmeijer-correction pro-
duces larger standard errors. In consequence, we use the
one-step estimator in the baseline model. It is noteworthy,
nevertheless, that the debt coefficient resulting from the
two-step estimator is considerably higher, indicating a
possible underestimation in the baseline model. In model
6, we acknowledge the idea that increasing the stringency
of the debt brake is a response to past deficits (Feld and
Kirchgässner, 2008). A similar argument could be made
for the interest rate, which introduces some endogeneity
into the model, reducing the credibility of the debt co-
efficient. The sixth model therefore declares the regressors
of the institutional conditions category as endogenous
and, in turn, constructs GMM-style instruments with
them. This modification reduces the debt coefficient
slightly to 0.034. Model 7 increases the instrument count
by deepening them to the fifth lag in order to evaluate
their influence on the estimated coefficients. The resulting
debt coefficient remains virtually unchanged in compari-
son to the baseline model.
While the previous model adjustments justify the spec-
ifications of the baseline model, two further estimations
emphasize the robustness of the results from a different
perspective. Model 8 acknowledges Basel City and
Geneva as outliers and re-estimates the baseline model
without the respective observations from these two
cases. The resulting debt coefficient jumps to 0.087,
suggesting that the two cantons pull the average effect
downwards in the baseline model. As a qualitative check
on robustness, model 9 uses the plain interest rate instead
of the logged interest spread as the dependent variable,
leaving the full sample intact. This last model accounts for
the problematic sample selection which is due to the
definition of the risk-free rate. Even if the coefficient is not
quantitatively comparable, the result supports a positive
and significant effect of the debt on the interest rate.
The last three models 10 to 12 drop one category of
controls each. In contrast to model 10, where the debt
coefficient remains unchanged, dropping the respective
variables leads to a decline of the debt coefficient in model
11 and 12, which represents an omitted variable bias.
Overall, model 2 appears to be a reasonable baseline
for estimating the optimal debt level in the next sub-
section. The point estimate of 0.048 for the debt co-
efficient is situated in between the highest and lowest
estimates of all the models. Since a higher coefficient
translates into a steeper interest curve, the more conser-
vative (lower) the resulting optimal debt level, the higher
the estimated debt coefficient.
Figure 4 in the Appendix illustrates the predicted inter-
est rate curves in 2014, a year in which capital markets
Table 1 Regression results (Continued)
(1)
Fixed
effects
(2)
Baseline
(3) Assets
and equity
(4) Year
dummies
(5) Two
step
(6)
Endogenous
(7) Lags (8) No GE
and BS
(9) Interest
rate
(10) No
conditions
(11) No
capacity
(12) No
stability
Election year
(dummy)
0.035 0.041 0.049 0.034* 0.062 0.513*** 0.041 0.044 3.256 0.042 0.036
(0.027) (0.028) (0.036) (0.019) (0.039) (0.175) (0.027) (0.030) (3.120) (0.027) (0.027)
Risk-free rate
(in basis points)
0.226***
(0.046)
N 841 841 618 841 841 841 841 773 884 841 841 841
Number of
groups
26 26 26 26 26 26 26 24 26 26 26 26
Number of
instruments
41 45 105 41 47 47 41 41 33 29 29
F statistic entire
model
88.22 68.62*** 71.82** 53.68*** 28.79*** 73.39*** 81.45*** 100.60*** 823.49*** 62.25*** 41.56*** 46.70***
Hansen statistic
(chi2)
8.54 9.27 0.00 8.54 7.80 10.44 8.04 8.97 12.17 15.08 16.18
AR(1) − 2.74*** − 2.37** − 3.41*** − 2.73*** − 3.04*** − 2.75*** − 2.62*** − 2.77** − 2.68*** − 2.48** − 2.75***
AR(2) 1.11 0.98 0.80 1.08 − 0.52 1.06 0.79 1.01 1.20 1.09 1.12
Notes: System GMM estimation (one-step) with standard errors corrected for finite samples and clustered at cantonal level in parentheses. Significance
levels: ***1%; **5%, and *10%. The dependent variable is the subsequent (t + 1) cantonal log of the spread between the interest rate on the debt and
the risk-free rate. Endogenous regressors: “lagged dependent variable” and debt per capita (except in model 4); instruments: tax revenue forecasting
misestimations, GMM-style instruments of endogenous regressors (lags 2 to 3, collapsed)
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performed well, for cantons selected to vary by size,
language, and urbanization. Out of the 26 cantons, the
95% confidence interval covers the true value (including
all the cantons shown in Fig. 4 in the Appendix) in 18
cases; the model overestimates the interest rate for 2 can-
tons and underestimates it in 5 cases. There is no esti-
mation for the canton of Zug, as it served as proxy for the
risk-free rate in 2014. This finding underscores the pre-
cision of the baseline regression.
Although the abscissa covers different ranges of debt per
capita, there are different shapes and levels of the interest
rate curve. While Geneva is the most indebted (nearly
34,000 Swiss francs per capita), it still enjoys a lower in-
terest rate than wealthier cantons (161 basis points). If all
cantons had to manage a debt equivalent to Geneva’s in
2014, their interest rate would vary between 44 basis points
(Appenzell Inner-Rhodes) and 758 basis points (Aargau),
with an average of 369 basis points. This variation empha-
sizes how differently cantons can profit from leveraged
investments. With reference to the median performance of
the Swiss pension funds, their investments yield a
return of 731 basis points (see Figure 3 in Appendix).
3.2 Estimated profits
Based on the interest rate curves and the returns, profits
and optimal debt levels can be calculated optimizing
Eq. (8). Figure 2 depicts the respective results for the same
selection of cantons as above. The dashed vertical line on
the left shows the initial debt level (i.e., B0), where the can-
tons take no profits, since, by assumption, cantons hold
no unbound assets providing a return.15 Decreasing the
debt level beyond B0 is impossible by definition, since
the cantons use the initial debt to fund their product-
ive capital. With new re-invested liabilities, the can-
tons generate additional profit until they reach the
optimal debt level B1 indicated by the right dashed
line. The shape of the interest rate curve translates
into B1 , or inversely, the optimal debt level informs
the steepness of the interest rate curve.
If one takes the two cantons of Basel City (BS) and Gen-
eva (GE), then their two graphs in Fig. 2 reveal a similar
B1 . Therefore, the underlying interest rate curves of the
two cantons resemble each other (see Figure 4 in the Ap-
pendix). At the same time, Basel City has a higher profit
potential since it starts at a lower initial debt level. Among
the cantons portrayed in Fig. 2, Obwalden (OW) draws
the highest profit, reaching 942 Swiss francs per capita
(12.57% of its total receipts). The required debt amounts
to 13 times the initial debt level of 1962 Swiss francs per
capita. By contrast, the canton of Geneva already operates
nearly at its optimal debt level and has a potential return
of only 717 Swiss francs per capita (0.78% of its total re-
ceipts) when increasing its debt by 16%.
While these examples give an impression of the profit
potential in selected cantons in a specific year, they can-
not provide the broader picture. For that purpose, Table 2
summarizes the results when exploiting the entire data
set from 1997 (the first year when the performance of
the Swiss pension fund was published) to 2015. For each
equation parameter (5)—except the return rate, whose
values are illustrated in Figure 3 in Appendix—, the
table lists the summary statistics for three different debt
strategies. In the first strategy, the cantons adjust their
debt level each year to the optimum B1 . The resulting
profit accordingly serves as a benchmark for the other
strategies, since a canton cannot do better than that.
The other two strategies account for the reasonable doubt
that the optimum might not be feasible (and a too exorbi-
tant debt level may potentially trigger political protest).
Therefore, the second strategy limits the adjusted
debt level to 100% of the receipts, following the
recommendation of the Conference of Cantonal Fi-
nance Ministers (2008). Still, the capital markets might
not accept a sudden and vigorous adjustment of the
debt level. Accordingly, the third strategy only allows an
adjustment of the debt level to the mean value of the last
year and the current optimum (i.e., a moving average of
2 years).
Focusing on the first strategy, the statistics of the
initial debt level B0 provide information about a sub-
sample of the data in Table 3. When only considering
the period from 1997 to 2015, the mean debt per
capita rises to 7027 Swiss francs per capita (in com-
parison to 6083 Swiss francs for the entire sample). If
the cantons had adjusted the debt each year to their
individual optimum (B^

), they would have more than
doubled the initial debt to 17,736 Swiss francs per
capita on average. In terms of the annual receipts, the
adjusted debt is almost double. In one extreme case, a
canton would need to adjust the debt to almost seven
times its receipts in 1 year. This raises some doubt
whether a canton can really issue that volume of bonds
in a single year. Consequently, we consider some more
conservative strategies below.
The combination of the two lines in Table 2 listing the
estimated (^i0) and the observed initial interest rate (i0) is
an indicator of the model’s goodness of fit. The resem-
blance of their mean and median underpins the ad-
equacy of the estimations. At the optimal debt level, the
interest rate i^1 would lie not even one percentage point
higher at 3.28% on average. The minimum value of
0.35% stems from setting the optimal debt level equal to
the initial debt level. This constellation appears several
times, and it typically occurs in years with a low return
rate. Feeding the model with all previously discussed pa-
rameters yields a profit from the leveraged investments
Christen and Soguel Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics           (2019) 155:4 Page 10 of 17
which would cover 4.78% of total cantonal receipts.
Considering the much lower median value of 1.45%
shows how strongly right-skewed the distribution is.
That is, the average is driven by few high values (up
to 50.25%), though these extreme values drop drama-
tically when truncating the maximum debt. Politically,
it seems easier to record and report several years
with rather low but positive profits and a few quite
negative ones rather than the revers. The last line of
the upper part in Table 2 therefore gives an idea of
the distribution of the profitable years per canton. Out
of the 19 years, nearly 12 turn out to be profitable on
average. Yet, one canton would have never benefitted.
Strategy 2 limits the annual debt increase to 100% of
the receipts. Most cantons actually hit the boundary as
the median of the B^1 -to-rev. ratio of 100% shows. Still,
there are cantons with debt levels above the truncation
because their initial debt level exceeded the limit. Conse-
quently, no adjustment took place in these cantons. The
truncation brings down the adjusted debt level to 9367
Swiss francs per capita, which corresponds to almost
halving the debt in comparison to the first strategy. Of
course, limiting the debt increase impacts the profit,
whose mean sharply decreases to 1.11% of total receipts.
Nevertheless, one canton reached a value of 6.98%. Ban-
ning high debt values also cuts the interest rates, whose
mean shrinks to 2.54% compared to 3.28% in strategy 1.
Finally, strategy 3 leaves the truncation point at 100%
of the receipts and it then adjusts the debt to the mean
between the previous and the current year’s optimum.
Fig. 2 Predicted profit curve from leveraged investments in 2014
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Such calibration allows maladjustments and thereby
also produces negative profits. At the bottom of the
distribution, one canton must tolerate a painful loss
of − 6.61% of its annual receipts. Nonetheless, the
maximum value tenaciously sticks at plus 6%, while
on average, the cantons only benefit from a profit of
0.77%. Interestingly, the number of profitable years
lies above that of strategy 2. The reason is that strat-
egy 2 produces debt adjustments above the truncation
point if the previous year’s optimal debt is high
enough. In sum, even with this rather conservative
strategy, every canton except Geneva would have real-
ized a positive profit over the entire time span from
1997 to 2015. Moreover, some cantons have considerable
potential, particularly in later years. Obwalden, for in-
stance, would have reached profits of 3.02% (2012),
4.34% (2013), and 4.46% (2014).
4 Conclusion
This article connects the interest rate curve to the
return attainable in the capital markets by tracing the
borrowing cost of a state as a function of the debt level.
The purpose was to assess the profit a state or canton
can achieve by issuing loans and investing the raised
capital afterwards in the capital markets. By imposing
an increasing convex interest rate curve, our theory
proposed that there was an optimal debt level. To es-
timate the coefficients of the variables determining
the interest rate, panel data from the Swiss cantons
from 1980 to 2015 served as our database. Taking the
dynamics and endogeneity issues into account, a
GMM estimation is the most appropriate method for
the model. We approximated the return from the
capital markets using median values of the perform-
ance of Swiss pension funds.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of profit sensitivity
Debt strategy/parameter Median Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
(1) annual adjustment to optimal debt level
B0 (initial debt level) 5.18 7.03 6.55 1.05 36.07
B^

(optimal debt level) 16.75 17.74 12.08 1.80 66.55
B^

1/rev. (optimal debt in % of receipts) 161.41% 178.67% 1.34 0.00% 720.07%
i0 (observed initial interest rate) 2.46% 2.51% 0.01 0.00% 6.44%
i^0 (estimated initial interest rate based on B0) 2.46% 2.41% 0.01 0.09% 5.28%
i^1 (estimated interest rate at B^

) 3.24% 3.28% 0.01 0.35% 6.88%
π^ (estimated profit [in % of total receipts]) 1.45% 4.78% 7.05 0.00% 50.25%
Profitable years per canton 14.50 11.54 7.21 0 19
(2) Annual adjustment up to 100% of receipts
B0 (initial debt level) 5.18 7.03 6.55 1.05 36.07
B^1 (adjusted debt level) 8.17 9.37 6.18 1.80 36.07
B^1/rev (adjusted debt in % of receipts) 100.00% 87.28% 0.37 0.00% 211.41%
i0 (observed initial interest rate) 2.46% 2.51% 0.01 0.00% 6.44%
i^0 (estimated initial interest rate based on B0) 2.46% 2.41% 0.01 0.09% 5.28%
i^1 (estimated interest rate at B^

) 2.60% 2.54% 0.01 0.13% 5.96%
π^ (estimated profit [in % of total receipts]) 0.13% 1.11% 1.55 0.00% 6.98%
Profitable years per canton 11.50 9.69 6.22 0 18
(3) 2 years moving average adjustment up to 100% of receipts
B0 (initial debt level) 5.16 7.02 6.60 1.05 36.07
B^1 (adjusted debt level) 7.94 9.39 6.04 1.93 35.54
B^1/rev (adjusted debt in % of receipts) 94.63% 86.26% 0.33 0.00% 204.77%
i0 (observed initial interest rate) 2.40% 2.42% 0.01 0.00% 5.86%
i^0 (estimated initial interest rate based on B0) 2.39% 2.33% 0.01 0.09% 5.28%
i^1 (estimated interest rate at B^

) 2.52% 2.46% 0.01 0.13% 5.99%
π^ (estimated profit [in % of total receipts]) 0.23% 0.77% 1.37 − 6.61% 6.06%
Profitable years per canton 12.00 11.15 5.15 1 18
Notes: Unbalanced panel of 26 cantons and 19 years (1997 to 2015); n = 468
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When optimizing the debt level each year, the cantons
have the potential to generate 4.78% of their total re-
ceipts, on average, through leveraged investments. Yet,
the optimal debt level strongly depends on the returns in
the capital markets, which in turn fluctuates considerably
from 1 year to the next. This creates doubt whether
the cantons can annually adjust their debt level to the
same extent. When limiting their yearly adjustments
to 100% of their receipts, the profit drops to 1.11%
on average.
The calculated profits are rather conservative, because
the theoretical model abstracts from the fact that can-
tons already possess financial assets that yield a return.
The model assumes that the cantons carry only adminis-
trative assets in their balance sheet, without financial
gain. Having said this, the model accounts for risks only
to a certain extent. Prediction errors of the return rate
can lead to fatal debt adjustments that engender high
losses. The third investment strategy gives an impres-
sion of losses when the canton cannot adjust its debt
level immediately. Occasionally, the deficit climbs up to
6.61% of the total cantonal receipts. Risk-averse govern-
ments that reflect voter preferences would borrow less
than the optimal debt level, which further cuts the
profit potential.
One can use the hypothetical invested sum of all
cantons in 2015 to show their importance in the
capital market. Assuming the third strategy, together
they would have invested 26.6 billion Swiss francs,
while the market capitalization of the 20 shares of
the Swiss Market Index amounts to 1128.3 billion
Swiss francs in the same year.16 This comparison
also supports our claim that the practice of cantonal
leveraged investments probably would not have an
effect on the return rates of the (international) capital
markets.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable Source Mean Std.
dev.
Min. Max.
Interest rate (in basis points) Own calculations based on data of the Swiss federal
finance administration
336.043 122.71 8.297 783.488
Risk-free rate [lowest cantonal interest rate per
annum] (in basis points)
Own calculations based on data of the Swiss federal
finance administration
149.071 70.467 0.371 238.63
Interest spread (in basis points) Own calculations based on data of the Swiss federal
finance administration
186.972 84.343 1.453 581.618
Debt (in 1000 CHF per capita) Swiss federal statistical office 6.083 5.621 0.405 36.066
Cantonal overall fiscal balance (1000 CHF per capita) Swiss federal finance administration − 0.076 0.538 −
4.636
2.692
Cantonal equity (1000 CHF per capita)a Swiss federal finance administration 0.838 3.501 −
17.025
20.584
Cantonal non-administrative assets (1000 CHF per
capita)a
Swiss federal finance administration 4.421 3.187 0.722 21.295
Interest receivable (1000 CHF per capita) Swiss federal finance administration 0.278 0.239 0.038 1.759
Tax revenue (in 1000 CHF per capita) Swiss federal finance administration 3.467 2.271 0.718 14.486
Municipal overall fiscal balance (1000 CHF per capita) Swiss federal finance administration − 0.018 0.221 −
0.814
0.943
Nominal GDP (in 1000 CHF per capita) BAK Basel Economics 51.005 19.903 17.235 162.389
Log (population) Swiss federal statistical office 12.023 1.125 9.456 14.185
Population growth (in %) Swiss federal statistical office 0.754 0.736 −
1.569
6.960
Elderly (as % of total population) Swiss federal statistical office 15.141 2.196 10.183 21.756
Young (as % of total population) Swiss federal statistical office 23.948 3.415 16.102 33.584
Unemployment (in %) Swiss federal statistical office 2.252 1.725 0.000 7.800
Bourgeois parties in executive (as % of all members) Swiss federal statistical office 43.518 20.394 0.000 100.000
Referendum stringency (index; 1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) Frey and Stutzer (2000) 3.856 1.296 0.000 6.000
Accounting standard (index; 1 [poor] to 3 [strong]) Own inquiry 1.090 0.354 1.000 3.000
Debt brake (index; 1 [poor] to 3 [restrictive]) Feld and Kirchgässner (2008) 0.572 0.978 0.000 3.000
No bailout (dummy = 1 after 2003) 0.321 0.467 0.000 1.000
n = 841 (unbalanced panel with t = 34 and N = 26)
an = 618
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The governments must carefully plan any specific
implementations of such practices. If the cantons enter
the capital markets as significant investors, there is a
high risk of politicization, rent-seeking, or even corrup-
tion (Bohn, 2002). So far, Basel City is the only canton
which has installed a (partly politically independent)
committee for asset and liability management (ALM).
While this example of good governance, together with
foreign experiences with public investment funds, could
serve as a point of reference (Mitchell, Piggott, and
Kumru, 2008), further research is needed with respect
to the optimal checks and balances such investments
would need.
A politician, or more concretely the finance minis-
ter, certainly has to bear in mind several aspects
when considering debt as a revenue source. Even if
she was risk-indifferent, as we assumed, voters
penalize losses more sharply than they value gains.
Moreover, the voters settle up with the politician rela-
tively frequently each election year, which imposes in-
efficient incentives on the politician. Shortly before
the election, he might reduce cantonal exposure to
the capital market and reduce the gross debt in order
to prevent any negative surprises, even if current
returns would suggest investing more. Just after the
election, he might invest too aggressively hoping that
the voter will forget potential losses until the next
election. Such issues could be addressed by limiting
the political influence on the ALM committee and by
separating the funds from cantonal accounting bodies
and practices.
5 Endnotes
1The term “spread” denotes the difference between
two rates. This might either be the difference between
the risk-free rate and the interest rate on public debt
(the interest spread), or the difference between the inter-
est rate on public debt and the return rate of capital
markets (the return spread).
2Usually, states already hold some liquid assets that
are unbound; this is to guarantee, at any time, an imme-
diate payment of current liabilities.
3Such an immediate raising of the interest rate for all
outstanding debts abstracts from different maturity
dates.
4At the same time, we assume that the return rate
from the capital market (r) and the economic growth (g)
are independent of the debt level. The latter relation has
been discussed intensively in the literature (Herndon,
Ash, and Pollin, 2014).
5A high persistence in the overall cantonal interest rate
on the debt results from long-term cantonal bonds. They
constitute the majority of the debt.
6Note the first differences Δϵc, t = ϵc, t − ϵc, t − 1 and
Δln(sc, t) = ln (sc, t) − ln (sc, t − 1) where ln(sc, t) = δ ln (sc,
t − 1) + γBc, t − 1 + β
′xc, t − 1 + ϵc, t − 1. Hence, both dif-
ferences share the term ϵc, t − 1 which explains why
E[Δln(sc, t)Δϵc, t] ≠ 0.
7Their utility as instruments is only given though if
E[Δln(sc, t − 1)Δϵc, t] = 0, which can be tested (i.e., the
autoregression AR (2) test in Table 1).
8Roodman's (2006) Stata command facilitates the prac-
tical application.
9We cannot exclude that the fiscal balance partly
captures the effect of the debt on the interest rate since
today’s deficit contributes to tomorrow’s debt. The debt
coefficient would in this case be downward biased. Yet,
the gross debt can vary independently from the fiscal
balance (in our sample, the correlation amounts to − 0.18)
as consists of more than the cumulated deficits.
10A parallel opposite effect on the expenditures is
hardly observable in Switzerland since the cantons are
not responsible for unemployment benefits.
11The correlation between the two alternative mea-
sures of the risk-free rate is 0.84.
12For the US government, Bohn (2002) finds the social
security trust fund to be the most appropriate to manage
uncommitted public funds, when taking potential rent-
seeking into account.
13The effect of the accounting standard index follows
expectations. Recoding the variable into dummies for
the second generation of the harmonized accounting
model (HAM2) and the international public sector
accounting standards (IPSAS) reveals that it is the
former accounting standard which mainly drives the
coefficient. The latter dummy is not significant.
14Note that the coefficients indicate an interest spread
adjustment in percent because the dependent variable is
expressed in logarithmic terms. This is not equal to an
adjustment in percentage points, which would admit-
tedly be easier to interpret.
15This assumption diminishes the estimated profits
and hence makes them more conservative, because
current returns on unbound assets are not added to the
profit. In practice, non-administrative (unbound) assets
average 49.81% from 1990 to 2015, with a return of
1.37% of total receipts. Hence, they are taken into
account when estimating the debt coefficient (by con-
trolling for the interest receivable) holding a signifi-
cant negative coefficient. Since the interest receivable
and the debt are strongly positively correlated (0.85)
omitting the former from the estimation equation
would result in a lower (less conservative) estimate of
the debt coefficient.
16Information retrieved from the annual statistics of
SIX Swiss Exchange Ltd. (www.six-swiss-exchange.com/
statistics/annual_statistics/)
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6 Appendix
Fig. 4 Predicted interest rate curve for the year 2014
Fig. 3 Mean, minimal and maximal return of Swiss pension funds
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